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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WALLACE R. SMITH, dha SMITH
REALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and App,ellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8302

C. TAYLOR BURTON,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION
Plaintiff petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter and in support
thereof states as follows:
I. That the decision filed on the 1st day of August,
1955, in the above entitled matter contains a basic mis-.
application and misconstruction of the so-called Parol
Evidence Rule as concerns the commission agreement
dated the 1st of May, 1953.
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II. That the decision deprives plaintiff without
any justification of commissions which in equity and
good conscience were due him and in effect creates a
penalty and forfeiture.
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that a rehearing be
granted and as to the May 1st agreement, the Court affirm the lower court's decision.
DATED this 19th day of August, 1955.
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERT & BLACK AND
DWIGHT L. KING

BY--------------------------------------------------..
Dwight L. King
Counsel for Appellant
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

BRIEF· IN SUPPORT· OF PLAIN·TIFF'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Parties will be referred to throughout this brief as
they were in the trial court.
:All italics are ours.
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STATEMENT OF F'ACTS
In the decision of this court, it held that the trial
court could not consider parol evidence in interpreting
and construing the following agreement:
"As my commission for services in connection with that Exchange Agreement dated May
1, 1953 (with Toone) I will take ¥2 of rental fee
for pastures for the 1953 season until a total of
$2,000 is paid, together with sorrel horse, saddle
and bridle. Smith to rernt pastures."
The facts concerning the drawing and signing of
the quoted agreement were generally undisputed. It is
in longhand, was written by the defendant on a scratch
pad and was drawn without either party consulting or
being advised by an attorney.
The agreement was intended by both parties to provide for a means of payment for commission on the exchange of certain real property which was fully consummated as a result of the efforts of plaintiff.
There was no discussion nor claim that the parties
intended to work a forfeiture or penalty on plaintiff by
the hastily drawn and unconsidered memorandum.
POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I. THIS COURT HAS MISAPPLIED AND MISCONSTRUED THE SO--CALLED PAROL EVIDENCE RULE.

In the decision of the court, it is stated:
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"It is impossible to determine how such finding could be reached, except by considering parol
evidence, since such finding is the antithesis of
the plain terms of the memoradum."
The quoted language indicates that the court has
fallen into the error of considering the Parol Evidence
Rule as a rule of evidence. It has long been conceded
that the Parol Evidence Rule is a rule of substantive
law and do'es not concern the receipt or rejection of
evidence.
The rule actually concerns whether or not the terms
of an integrat.ea written instrument may be varied by
parol evidence. It does not prohibit the receipt by the
finder of fact of evidence concerning the oral transactions. How the information which remained in an oral
form can he used by the finder of fact in his interpretation of the written instrument is the subject of the Parol
Evidence Rule. The rule has been the subject of a very
careful and considered opinion by this court.
In Fa,rr v. Wasatch ChemiCJal Co., 105 Utah 272,
143 P. 2d 281, this court, after a careful analysis of the
Parol Evidence Rule, sets. down the principles which are
applicable and which are not seriously controverted by
any authority. It stated as follows:

"* * * The rule is, of course well established,
but it has no application here. The problem of
ascertaining when the rule applies to a given
fact situation is discussed by Wigmore, Sec. 2430
of his work on Evidence. It is there stated: 'The
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inquiry is whether the writing was intended to
cover a certain subject of negotiation; for if it
was not, then the writing does not embody the
transaction on that subject * * *. Whether a
particular subject of negotiation is embodied by
the writing depends wholly upon the intent of the
parties thereto * * *. This intent must be sought
* * * in the conduct and language of the parties
and the surrounding circumstances * * *. The
question being whether certain subjects of negotiation were intended to he covered, we must compare the writing and the negotiations before we
can determine whether they were in fact covered.
* * * In deciding upon this intent, the chief and
most satisfactory index for the judge is found in
the circumstances whether or not the particular
element of the alleged extrinsic negotiation is
dealt with at all in the writing. If it is mentioned,
covered, or dealt with in the writing, then presumably the writing was meant to represent all
of the transaction on that element; if it is not,
then probably the writing was not intended to
embody that element of the negotiation."
It is plaintiff's position that this court has failed
to consider or apply the rules which it enunciated in the
Farr case to the uncontradicted facts of this case.
This court in its present decision did not compare
the subject of negotiations and the final written instrument as Judge Jeppson did in arriving at his decision.
This court completely rejects all of the oral evidence
which outlines the nogotiations. It looked only at the
writing. As Wigmore explains in his treatise on eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
dence, such action does not place the written instrument
on its proper base nor giv·e an outline of the subject
matter to he covered by the written instrument, Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. IX, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2430 - 2431, pp
97 - 104.
This court in its decision states that "It is impossible
to determine how such finding could be reached, except
by considering parol evidence, since such finding is the
antethesis of the plain terms of the memorandum." It,
in effect, is saying that parol evidence cannot be received
because it is varying the terms of the writing. Wigmore,
supra, p. 102 points out the error of this kind of reasoning in the foil owing language :
" (a) It is not uncommon to speak of the
present rule as a rule against 'varying the terms
of the writing.' No doubt that is precisely the
result of applying the rule. But it can never serve
as a test to determine in the first instance whether
the rule is applicable. The applicabllity and the
effect of the rule .are distinct things. To employ
this phrase as a test is to reason in a circle; for
it is to attempt to decide whether something con·ceded to be different from the writing ought to
·be excluded, by showing that it is different. All
the phrases about transactions that 'vary,' or 'contradict,' or are 'inconsistent,' involve the same
futility. The fundamental question is as to the
intent of the parties to restrict the writing to
specific elements or subjects of negotiation (ante,
§ 2430, par. 3); and if that intent existed, then
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the other subjects of negotiation can he established, even though they be (as they usually are)
different from the writing:''

* * * * * * *
"'(h) It has occasionally been laid down that,
in ascertaining, in the first instance, the parties'
intent to embody or not in the writing certain
subjects of negotiation, 'the writing is the sole
criterion,' i.e. no search for data of intent can be
made outside the four corners of the document:"
* * * * * * *
"~Such a proposition, however, is untenable,
both on principle and in practice. In practice, it
is not enforced by its theoretical advocates. In
theory, its fallacy is indicated by what has been
already notice (arnte, §2430). The problem being
to ascertain whether the parties intended a certain
writing to cover certain subjects, the relation
between the writing and those subjects and their
conduct is necessarily involved; and all these
matters must be considered.***"

The Wigmore reasoning which is obviously sound,
was adopted in this court by the F:arr decision but has
been ignored by the court in its present decision.
This court did not examine the writing to see
whether or not the elements were all dealt with which
were covered by the oral negotiations between the parties. A mere restatement of the matters which the court
must pass upon demonstrates that they are not covered
by the written instrument. For instance, nothing in the
written instrument covers in any way the contingency
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which arose, namely, that a total of $2,000.00 was not
received from the rental of the pastures during the 1953
season. This contingency, the plaintiff stated, was discussed orally and it was. agreed that if the rental did not
amount of $2,000.00, he was to be paid that sum on October 1st.
Can it ·possibly be claimed that the memorandum
covered the contingency and as to said matter was an
integrated written instrument~ That particular element
is not dealt with any place in the writing and the only
evidence upon it must be of an oral nature.
The court underlines the words, "Smith to rent
pastures" and seems to feel that this language can be
interpreted to mean that 8mith assumed all responsibilities for the rental of the pastures and would forfeit
the $2,000.00 which he had earned if the pastures proved
to be unrentable. This language the trial court interpreted in the light of the negotiations between the parties. To arrive at its true meaning necessitated the receipt and consideration of statements made by both parties and the sele~ction from among the contradictory
testimonies of what should be believed. Apparently, the
court assumed that without considering any oral negotiations that "Smith to rent pastures'' meant that if
Smith did not rent the pastures he forfeited all claim to
the $2,000.00 fee which he has earned and further that
he was to rent the pastures regardless of their condition
or the obstacles which could be placed in his path by deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant. It is impossible for plaintiff to understand how
the court can conclude tha;t the phrase, "Smith to rent
pastures" could be interpreted without considering the
negotiations between the parties whi'Ch were oral in
form. Without considering the oral transaction the only
logical meaning we submit is to conclude that Smith was
to have the right to n·egotiate rental contracts and would
undertake to discharge that duty. Certainly, it could not
be claimed that the forfeiture which this court has decreed was a particular element dealt with at all in writing.
The court suggests that plaintiff amend his complaint since nothing was pleaded about defendant fixing
the fence. This suggestion reveals a failure to understand not only the Parol Evidence Rule but our new
rules of civil procedure. It is no longer necessary to
plead facts in order to prove them at the trial. It is sufficient to merely plead that defendant owes plaintiff and
all evidence bearing on the subject may be received. See
Forms of Complaints, pp. 837 to 844, Vol. 9, U.C.A. 1953.
There was never any objections by any party during the
trial to receipt of evidence on the fence being down and
the pasture not rentable. The evidence is without contradictions and is found throughout the whole transcript
both from plaintiff and defendant that defendant actually undertook fencing to enclose the pasture.
This pasture enclosure agreement is another illustration of a part of the agreement between the parties
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which cannot be found mentioned at all in the May 1st
writing. Its proof must be made by showing oral transactions which under the Farr decision and Wigmore's
prin'ciples is proper.
The F·arr case, plaintiff submits, sets forth the applicable principles concerning the use .and application
of the parol evidence rule. The court in the present case
has overlooked the Farr decision. It has failed completely to consider the principles which are set forth in
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol 9, p. 97, Sec. 24302431.
It is respectfully submitted that the quoted agreement of May 1st cannot be classified as a fully integrated
agreement between plaintiff and defendant concerning
the arrangements for the commission on the Toone transaction. It is obviously a partial integration and as a
partial integration the trial court and this court must
consider oral transactions which explain and complete
the particular elements which are not dealt with at all
in the written instrument. The only evidence of what
the parties intended on the matters not contained or
dealt with at all in the writing can only be resolved by
resort to their negotiations which were oral in nature
and which were not embodied in the written instrument.
It is respectfully subn1itted that this court in its
decision on the May 1st agreement has deprived plaintiff of a commission which was fully earned; that it has
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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done this without considering the legal principles applicable to the interpretation of said agreement; that
it has adopted a strained interpretation of the agreement which results in an inequitable and unjust result.
Plaintiff could understand the resort to a strained interpretation to effect an equitable result but where the
result is inequitable and deprives a pa1'1ty of a commission which has been completely earned, it is impossible
for plaintiff to understand the court's decision.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the court has misapplied the parol evidence rule and has misconstrued
an'd misinterpreted the agreement of May 1, 1953; that
as a result its decision works an inequitable and unjust
result, and the court should reconsider and reverse its
ruling as concerns the $2,000.00 commission earned by
plaintiff on the Toone transaction.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK and DWIGHT L. KING

Oownsel for Appell.mnt
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake ·City, Utah
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Received ............................copies of the within Brief
of Plaintiff this ................ day ·o,f ........................................,
A. D. 1955.
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

